The Ethics of Food Production and Regulation of “Misbranding” by Hoffman, Selena
 
The Ethics of Food Production and Regulation of “Misbranding”
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Selena Hoffman, The Ethics of Food Production and Regulation of
“Misbranding” (April 2010).
Accessed February 19, 2015 9:21:54 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8965624
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Ethics of Food Production and Regulation of “Misbranding” 
Selena L. Hoffman, Class of 2010 
Food and Drug Law 
April 5, 2010 
Submitted in satisfaction of course requirement only 1 
 
Abstract 
  As consumers have become more conscious of the ethical implications of food choices, 
the food industry has capitalized on our concern by introducing labels that appeal to our moral 
sensibilities.  Labels such as “free range” and “cage free” influence the purchasing decisions of 
consumers because these labels suggest production methods with fewer harmful ethical 
implications, whether with regard to animal welfare or environmental sustainability.  In response 
to consumer demand for more ethical food choices, production method labeling has become 
widespread.  Nevertheless—and despite pervasive regulation of other types of food labeling— 
oversight of production methods claims is virtually nonexistent.  Thus, consumers rely on labels 
such as “free range” to make purchasing decisions, without knowing what “free range” really 
means.  The misbranding provisions of FDA’s and USDA’s authorizing statutes grant the 
agencies the ability to prohibit claims that are “false and misleading in any particular.”  Under 
these provisions, the agencies could regulate production method claims to protect American 
consumers who are concerned about the ethical implications of what they eat.  This paper 
explores the challenges to using the misbranding provision to regulate labeling of production 
methods—and how the provision might be used to protect consumers from false and misleading 
production method claims. 
Ethical Concerns about Food Production 
  The nationwide outrage that resulted in the 1906 passage of the first federal food and 
drug law and meat inspection act was not about the confinement of egg-laying hens or the 
treatment of veal calves.  It wasn’t about the number of calories or the amount of sugar in a food 
product.  Instead, Americans were concerned primarily with the disturbingly unsanitary 
conditions in which their food was being produced—conditions made known by the publication 2 
 
of Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, which documented the deplorable conditions of Chicago’s meat 
packing plants.  The public failed to sympathize with the workers of the meatpacking industry 
and adopt the socialist cause, as Sinclair—an ardent critic of capitalism—had hoped they would.  
But Sinclair’s novel did elicit public outrage when it exposed the meat packing industry’s 
unsanitary production methods, which included selling rotten, diseased meat to unsuspecting 
consumers.
1  Thus, the first federal food and drug law resulted from concerns about food safety. 
Concerns about our food supply today are much different.  Of course, Americans are still 
concerned about food safety, though now we believe that the United States Department of 
Agriculture (“USDA”) will ensure that our meat is neither rotten nor diseased.
2  But we want 
more than a guarantee that our food isn’t rotten.  We also want to know whether our food is 
healthy, including the caloric content, amount of sugar and sodium, and the quantity of vitamins 
in contains.  Just as the federal food and drug act of 1906 reflected the public’s concern with 
food safety, the National Labeling and Education Act (“NL&E Act”) of 1990 reflects our 
concern with the nutritional value of our foods.
3  Empowering consumers with the knowledge 
contained on the Nutrition Facts label, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) enables us to 
                                                             
1 Peter Barton Hutt & Peter Barton Hutt II, A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of 
Food, 39 Food Drug Cosmetic L.J. 2 (1984), reprinted in Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill & Lewis A. 
Grossman, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 10 (3d ed. 2007). 
2 Meat was also inspected at the turn of the twentieth century, when Sinclair wrote his expose of the meat packing 
industry.  (There was no federal regulation at that time, but states regulated food production prior to the enactment 
of federal laws.)  Indeed, The Jungle included stories about collusion between managers of the meat packing plants 
and supposed regulators, who would deliberately allow unsafe meat to be packaged for sale. 
3 See Peter Barton Hutt, A Brief History of FDA Regulation Relating to the Nutrient Content of Food, In Ralph 
Shapiro, ed., Nutrition Labeling Handbook, Ch.1 (1995), reprinted in Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill & Lewis 
A. Grossman, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 209 (3d ed. 2007). 3 
 
make informed decisions about the foods we consume.  But while current labeling requirements 
enable consumers to choose between foods based on nutritional value, they don’t enable us to 
make decisions based on ethical concerns about a food’s production.   
  Yet consumers today are concerned about more than food safety and nutritional content.  
As we’ve become aware of the ethical implications of modern-day food production, consumers 
have sought foods produced by methods with fewer harmful consequences for animal welfare 
and the environment.  Nearly all of the 10 billion animals that are raised for food in the United 
States each year are raised on factory farms under inhumane conditions, including confinement 
in filthy cages that are so small that the animals are unable to walk or turn around.
4  Factory 
farming also has disastrous environmental impacts, from significantly contributing to climate 
change to creating huge amounts of manure that pollute our soil, water, and air.
5  We’ve also 
become aware of the social implications of what we eat; for example, many consumers object to 
the use of biotechnology because it increases the “dependence of farmers throughout the world 
(but notably in less developed countries) on a limited number of multinational actors.”
6 
  Concern about the ethical implications of our food supply is obvious to anyone who has 
perused the aisles of a supermarket.  Food labels inform us that certain brands of eggs are “cage 
free” or “free range,” that our coffee is “fair trade,” and that our milk was produced by cows that 
were not shot up with genetically-engineered growth hormones.  Clearly, food producers are well 
                                                             
4 Official Food, Inc. Movie Site, “Hungry for Change? About the Issues,” http://www.foodincmovie.com/about-the-
issues.php.  Website accessed March 10, 2010. 
5 Humane Society of the United States website, “Factory Farming: Environmental Impact,” 
http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/environment/.  Website accessed March 10, 2010. 
6 Hub Zwart, A Short History of Food Politics, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 12: 113-126, 2000. 4 
 
aware of consumer concerns about the ethical production of food.  Indeed, even supermarket 
chains have responded to consumer demands.  In 2005, Whole Foods Market and Wild Oats 
announced that they would no longer sell eggs from caged hens.
7  More recently, Wal-Mart 
announced that its private label (“Great Value”) eggs are all cage-free.
8 
  The wide array of food labels targeting consumers who are concerned about ethical food 
production methods suggests that food producers know many consumers will choose products 
because they are less harmful to animal welfare or the environment.  Indeed, many consumers 
will pay a premium for these products, as the cost of a dozen “cage-free” eggs is invariably more 
expensive than a dozen eggs produced by caged hens.  Undoubtedly, these labels help consumers 
make food choices based on their ethical concerns—just as nutrition labeling helps consumers 
make healthy food choices.  In a world in which we are so far removed from the production of 
our food supply, labels are our only means of obtaining the information we need to make good 
decisions.  Because food producers respond to consumer demand, having information about food 
production methods not only enables consumers to make personal choices about what we eat— it 
also enables us to “effect a change in the way food is actually produced.”
9 
Production methods and the current regulation of food labeling 
Despite that labeling of food production methods has become so widespread, regulation 
of this labeling is essentially nonexistent.  Thus, food producers can capitalize on our ethical 
                                                             
7 “Wild Oats and Whole Foods Sow Compassion with Cage-Free Egg Policies,” Humane Society of the United 
States website, June 3, 2005, http://www.hsus.org/farm/camp/nbe/wildoats/wild_oats.html. 
8 “Wal-Mart: Private Label Eggs All Cage-Free,” Humane Society of the United States website, February 18, 2010, 
http://www.humanesociety.org/news/press_releases/2010/02/wal-mart_021810.html. 
9 Hub Zwart, A Short History of Food Politics, Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 12: 113-126, 2000. 5 
 
concerns about the food we eat with very little oversight of their claims.  The FDA’s regulation 
of food labeling focuses primarily on the ingredients in a food product and its nutritional content.  
Section 403 of the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FD&C Act”) includes both 
affirmative requirements for labeling and prohibitions against certain representations that are 
voluntarily included on a food label.  For example, the FD&C Act requires disclosure of 
information such as the name, ingredients and nutrient content of the food.  Additionally, it 
prohibits statements on labels that are “false and misleading in any particular.”
10  In 1990, the 
NL&E Act gave the FDA express authority to regulate nutrient content claims and disease 
prevention claims.
11  It requires FDA to define commonly-used nutrient descriptors—such as 
“high fiber,” “low fat” and “reduced cholesterol”—and to review disease prevention claims to 
determine their suitability for food labeling.
12  Thus, FDA’s regulation of food labeling pertains 
primarily to information about the content and nutritional value of foods—and does not include 
requirements specific to regulating food production claims. 
The United States Department of Agriculture, on the other hand, does specifically 
consider food production claims.  In 2002, USDA proposed regulations that would establish 
minimum requirements for commonly-used production claims, relating to production methods 
such as antibiotic use and confinement standards.
13  However, given that USDA is tasked not 
                                                             
10 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §403(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. §343.  
11 See Peter Barton Hutt, A Brief History of FDA Regulation Relating to the Nutrient Content of Food, In Ralph 
Shapiro, ed., Nutrition Labeling Handbook, Ch.1 (1995), reprinted in Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill & Lewis 
A. Grossman, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 209 (3d ed. 2007). 
12 Id. 
13 “United States Standards for Livestock and Meat Marketing Claims,” Agricultural Marketing Service, USDA, 67 
Federal Register 250 (30 December 2002), pp.75882-79556. 6 
 
only with protecting consumers, but also with promoting the nation’s agricultural products, we 
might wonder whether USDA minimum requirements for production claims would meet the 
ethical standards of consumers who rely on that information to distinguish between products.
14  
The livestock industry’s definition of “free range” or “cage free,” for example, might not 
comport with the concerned consumer’s definition of the same production claim.  Indeed, while 
the proposed standard suggests that “free range” means livestock having “continuous and 
unconfined access to pasture throughout their life cycle,” the USDA’s website defines it much 
differently—as simply livestock that has “access to the outside.”
15  Animal welfare organizations 
have strongly criticized the ability of livestock producers to label their products as “free range” 
or “cage free,” despite that the animals have little, if any, access to the outside and spend their 
entire lives in filthy, cramped sheds devoid of sunlight.
16  Consumers who buy eggs laid by 
purportedly “free range” or “cage free” hens buy these products because they believe the animals 
are humanely treated and live healthy lives.  They certainly don’t expect what USDA’s 
definitions allow. 
Toward regulation of food production claims - §403(a)’s “misbranding” provision 
  Neither the FD&C Act nor the Federal Meat Inspection Act (“FMIA”), which give FDA 
and USDA authority to regulate labeling of food products, refers to regulation of production 
                                                             
14 The proposed regulations referred to above, for example, note that their purpose is to enable meat producers to 
promote their products by credibly (through USDA certification) distinguishing them from those of their 
competitors.   See id. 
15 See id. See also “Fact Sheets: Meat and Poultry Labeling Terns,” Food Safety and Inspection Service website, 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Fact_Sheets/Meat_&_Poultry_Labeling_Terms/index.asp.  
16 “’Free-Range’ Poultry and Eggs: Not All They’re Cracked Up To Be,” United Poultry Concerns website, 
http://www.upc-online.org/freerange.html.  Website accessed March 10, 2010. 7 
 
method claims on food labeling.  Certainly, Congress could pass legislation requiring FDA or 
USDA to regulate labels such as “cage free,” just as Congress now requires FDA to review 
nutrient content claims and disease prevention claims.
17  Such legislation could compel the 
agencies to define commonly-used production claims and ensure that food producers labeling 
their products with those claims complied with the established definitions.
18  Production method 
labeling legislation could also simply give FDA and USDA the authority to regulate production 
method claims, without requiring that the agencies do so. 
  Even without legislation, however, FDA and USDA could regulate production method 
claims under their current authorizing statutes.  Specifically, the “misbranding” provision, which 
is identical in both the FD&C Act and the FMIA, could be used to ensure that production method 
claims are not misleading to consumers who make purchasing decisions based on ethical 
considerations.  The misbranding provision prohibits labels that are “false and misleading in any 
particular,” giving the agencies wide latitude in determining whether a food product has been 
misbranded.  The remainder of this paper will explore the challenges to using the misbranding 
provision to regulate production claim methods—and how the provision might be used to 
regulate such claims. 
                                                             
17 See Peter Barton Hutt, A Brief History of FDA Regulation Relating to the Nutrient Content of Food, In Ralph 
Shapiro, ed., Nutrition Labeling Handbook, Ch.1 (1995), reprinted in Peter Barton Hutt, Richard A. Merrill & Lewis 
A. Grossman, Food and Drug Law: Cases and Materials 209 (3d ed. 2007). 
18 Of course, how such production method claims are defined is important as well, as we see with the case of 
USDA’s current use of the “free range” definition—certainly consumers who buy products labeled with this claim 
think it means more than “access to the outside.”  8 
 
Using misbranding to regulate food production claims 
  The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act and the Federal Meat Inspection Act prohibit the 
misbranding of food in interstate commerce.
19  A food is misbranded if (among other reasons) its 
label is “false or misleading in any particular.”
20  The FD&C Act also further clarifies that 
labeling can be false or misleading based not only on the representations made, but also if “the 
labeling…fails to reveal facts material in light of such representations or material with respect to 
consequences which may result from the use of the article to which the labeling…relates under 
the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling…or under such conditions of use as are 
customary or usual.”
21  Thus, labeling can be deemed false or misleading under the FD&C Act in 
two different ways.  First, a representation on the label could be determined to be “false or 
misleading.”  Alternatively, FDA could determine that a food is misbranded based on what the 
label doesn’t say—if the missing information is deemed “material.”  Whether production claims 
can be regulated under the misbranding provision depends upon whether voluntarily-made 
labeling representations—such as “free range”—are false and misleading, or alternatively, 
whether failing to inform consumers of production methods is considered a failure to reveal 
material facts. 
“False and misleading in any particular” 
  Although FDA and USDA have not historically used the prohibition against misbranding 
to regulate production method claims, they could do so under the FD&C Act and the FMIA.  
Indeed, these statutes give the agencies broad authority to determine whether labels are false and 
                                                             
19 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §301(b), 21 U.S.C. §331.  Federal Meat Inspection Act, §610(c). 
20 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §403(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. §343.  Federal Meat Inspection Act, §601(n)(1). 
21 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §201(n), 21 U.S.C. §321. 9 
 
misleading.  The statutes themselves express this broad authority, as the agencies can determine 
that misbranding has occurred if the label is “false or misleading in any particular.”
22  This 
language suggests Congressional intent to enable the agencies to develop strong misbranding 
standards.  Courts have upheld that broad grant of discretion, reasoning that “remedial legislation 
such as the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal construction consistent with the 
Act’s overriding purpose to protect the public.”
23  Courts have also rejected the argument that the 
misbranding standard requires that the false or misleading statement be “material,” reaffirming 
the wide latitude given to the agencies enforcing it.
24 
The meaning of “false and misleading,” however, has evolved dramatically during the 
last century.  Although the federal food and drug act of 1906 included a misbranding provision, 
the courts were left to define what constitutes false and misleading labeling.  Early decisions 
established that a literally true statement could violate the Act, since “[d]eception may result 
from the use of statements not technically false or which may be literally true.”
25  Yet even if we 
accept that deception can result from technically true statements, we must also answer the 
question:  To whom must the statement be deceiving?  Who must be misled by the labeling in 
question for it to be deemed “false or misleading” and, thus, prohibited under the misbranding 
provision?  One of the first courts to address this issue determined that whether a label is 
misleading should be judged based on the consumer’s first impression, despite whether a more 
                                                             
22 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §403(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. §343.  Federal Meat Inspection Act, §601(n)(1). 
23 U.S. v. An Article of Drug…Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969). 
24 U.S. v. Jorgensen, 144 F.3d 550, 559 (1998).  The court also rejected that the argument that the “in any particular” 
language of the misbranding provision “violates due process because it is overly broad and vague.” 
25 U.S. v. Ninety-Five Barrels, More or Less, Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438, 443 (1924). 10 
 
deliberate reading would correct the initial impression.  Average consumers, the court reasoned, 
do not carefully analyze labels; instead they rely upon “a hasty glance or cursory examination.”
26  
Most recently, two different standards have been used to evaluate whether a label is false 
or misleading:  the “IUC” standard and the “reasonable consumer” standard.  The IUC standard, 
developed by courts after the passage of the FD&C Act in 1938, evaluates whether a label is 
misleading in reference to “the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous.”
27  The misbranding 
provision was construed broadly, making it irrelevant whether the reasonable consumer would 
understand the labeling.
28  The purpose of the Act is to protect the public, the courts reasoned, 
and the public includes “the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous who, when making a 
purchase, do not stop to analyze.”
29  The IUC standard thus attempts to protect all consumers, 
giving FDA and USDA wide latitude to deem labels false or misleading. 
In 2002, FDA clarified that it would use the “reasonable consumer” standard in 
evaluating whether labels are false or misleading.
30  This decision was an attempt to “rationalize 
the legal and regulatory environment for food promotion,” given that the Federal Trade 
Commission—which regulates misleading claims in food advertising—uses the reasonable 
consumer standard.  This standard, according to FDA, “more accurately reflects that consumers 
                                                             
26 U.S. v. Ten Barrels of Vinegar, 186 F. 399, 401 (D.C.Wis.1911). 
27 See U.S. v. Strauss, 999 F.2d 692, 696 (2
nd Cir. 1993).  
28 Id. 
29 U.S. v. El-O-Pathic Pharmacy, 192 F.2d 62, 75 (C.A.9 1951). 
30 “Guidance for Industry: Qualified Health Claims in the Labeling of Conventional Foods and Dietary 
Supplements; Availability,” Food and Drug Administration, HHS, 67 Federal Register 245 (20 December 2002), pp. 
78002-78004. 11 
 
are active partners in their own health care who behave in health promoting ways when they are 
given accurate health information.”
31  FDA’s decision also rested on first amendment case law 
precluding regulation of “the content of promotional communication so that is contains only 
information that will be appropriate for a vulnerable or unusually credulous audience.”
32  This 
suggests that the IUC standard may itself be constitutionally impermissible in that it seeks to 
protect all consumers, including those who are thought to be particularly vulnerable to 
potentially misleading labeling claims. 
Notwithstanding potential constitutional infirmities, the IUC standard and reasonable 
consumer standard can be analyzed by how well they enable FDA to effectuate the consumer 
protection purpose of the FD&C Act.  As earlier court decisions noted, the remedial nature of the 
legislation suggests that it should be read broadly to give the agency maximum ability to protect 
consumers.
33  In this sense, the IUC standard seems superior; FDA is tasked with protecting 
consumers as a whole, not just those consumers who carefully analyze labels.  Determining 
which standard is more appropriate, however, also depends upon the practical implications of 
choosing one standard over another.  It is questionable whether FDA would even reach different 
conclusions about whether a label is misleading by using one standard rather than the other. 
A new standard for evaluating “false and misleading” labels? 
  In the context of regulating production method claims, however, neither the IUC standard 
nor the reasonable consumer standard best protects those consumers who make purchasing 
decisions based on the ethical implications of what they eat.  Certainly, a consumer who is 
                                                             
31 Id. at 78004. 
32 Id., citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1983). 
33 U.S. v. Article of Drug…Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969). 12 
 
searching for “free range” eggs would not fall into the category of consumers who do not 
carefully analyze labels, but instead rely upon “a hasty glance or cursory examination.”
34  
Indeed, for these consumers—who are specifically looking for foods produced, for example, in 
humane ways—the IUC standard seems not to apply at all.  The reasonable consumer standard, 
on the other hand, could apply to production method claims—for example, “cage free” would be 
a misleading label if the eggs were produced by hens that were more severely confined that what 
the reasonable consumer would consider to be “cage free.”   
The reasonable consumer standard, however, leaves consumers who make purchasing 
decisions based on ethical considerations insufficiently protected from misleading claims; thus, 
the consumer protection purpose of the FD&C Act is not realized when production method 
claims are evaluated using this standard.  For example, the “reasonable consumer” might believe 
that “cage free” means simply that the chickens were not caged.  If so, the deplorable conditions 
in which hens that lay “cage free” eggs are kept—thousands of birds crammed so tightly into a 
shed devoid of sunlight that they can barely move
35—might be neither false nor misleading.  Yet 
it is virtually unquestionable that consumers who buy “cage free” eggs, and pay a premium in 
doing so, choose that product because they believe—whether “reasonably” or not—that the eggs 
were produced using hens that were humanely treated.  Consumers who care about the humane 
treatment of hens would not consider the conditions under which “cage free” hens are confined 
to be humane—yet they buy these eggs because they believe the hens are humanely treated.  
                                                             
34 United States v. Ninety-Five Barrels, More or Less, Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438, 401 (1924). 
35 “’Free-Range’ Poultry and Eggs: Not All They’re Cracked Up To Be,” United Poultry Concerns website, 
http://www.upc-online.org/freerange.html.  Website accessed March 10, 2010. 13 
 
Otherwise, why would these consumers be willing to pay a premium for the product labeled 
“cage free”? 
Furthermore, judging whether a production method claim is misleading under the 
reasonable consumer standard would allow the food industry to capitalize on the ethical concerns 
of consumers without delivering products that actually respond to those concerns.  As noted 
above, consumers are charged a premium for products labeled “cage free,” “free range,” or 
“humanely raised.”  These consumers are willing to pay this premium only because they believe 
they are purchasing products produced with fewer harmful consequences to the animals used in 
their production.  The extra cost is justified for these consumers because they recognize that 
raising animals humanely is more expensive for food producers.  However, producing “cage 
free” eggs may not actually be as expensive as consumers believe, given that the hens may 
simply be crammed into a windowless shed.  Thus, consumers are not only being duped into 
buying products that they wrongly believe were produced in a humane way—they are also being 
duped into paying more for those products.   
Because neither the IUC standard nor the reasonable consumer standard would 
effectively address the problem of misleading production method claims, a new standard should 
be used when evaluating whether such claims are “false or misleading.”  In the context of 
production method claims, consumers often choose products based on their ethical implications 
and—as we’ve seen—the food industry capitalizes on this concern by labeling their products 
with these claims.  Thus, the consumers who need FDA protection in this context are the 
consumers who are buying these products based on what they believe the claims, such as 
“humanely raised” or “cage free,” to mean.  It is irrelevant what other consumers—who are not 
concerned about whether their eggs are “cage free” and, thus, do not seek out these products—14 
 
believe the production method claims mean.  Thus, a more effective standard for evaluating 
whether production method claims are misleading might be called the “purchasing consumer” 
standard.  Such a standard would judge production method claims in reference to what the 
consumer purchasing the product—who undoubtedly cares about the production method, given 
that she is willing to pay a premium for such products—believes that it means.  Thus, if the 
“purchasing consumer” believes “cage free” means the hens that produce the eggs are humanely 
treated—and, therefore, chooses to buy those eggs over others—an egg producer would violate 
the misbranding prohibition if the hens were actually kept crammed into filthy, windowless 
sheds with no room to move.
36 
The regulation of production method claims may seem to be an overreach of FDA and 
USDA’s authority under the FD&C Act and the FMIA.  The mission of these agencies, some 
might argue, is simply to protect the health and safety of American consumers.  However, FDA 
and USDA have broad authority under the misbranding provisions of their statutes to protect 
consumers from labeling claims that are “false and misleading in any particular.”
37  Moreover, an 
analogy could be made to the economic adulteration prohibition in the FD&C Act, which 
provides that a food is adulterated if “any substance has been added thereto or mixed or packed 
therewith so as to…make it appear better or of greater value than it is.”
38  The economic 
adulteration provision is intended not to protect the health and safety of consumers, but instead to 
                                                             
36 Although there might be disagreement about what constitutes “humane” treatment, certainly the current conditions 
in which most animals raised for food are kept would not qualify as humane.  FDA or USDA regulations could 
identify an expert organization, such as the Humane Society of the United States, to determine what constitutes such 
“humane” treatment.  The accuracy of production method claims could then be based on such standards. 
37 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §403(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. §343.  Federal Meat Inspection Act, §601(n)(1). 
38 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §4032(b), 21 U.S.C. §342.   15 
 
protect their wallets.  Although the provision focuses on the addition of cheap ingredients (or 
omission of valuable ingredients)—and production method claims focus on the way in which the 
food was produced, rather than its ingredients—both could be said to protect consumer 
pocketbooks. 
Thus, FDA or USDA could regulate voluntarily-made production method claims by 
assessing whether the claims are “false and misleading in any particular” and, therefore, violate 
the misbranding provisions of the FD&C Act and the FMIA.  In doing so, however, the agencies 
should abandon the “reasonable consumer” standard and adopt a standard through which claims 
are assessed based on how the consumer who seeks out and purchases the product assesses 
them—the “purchasing consumer” standard.  This standard would ensure that consumers who 
make purchases based on the ethical implications of what they eat are not duped into buying 
products that do not meet their ethical standards—and paying more for those products. 
“False and misleading” due to failure to reveal material facts 
  The misbranding provision of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act not only prohibits 
labeling that is misleading due to representations made on the label; rather, the statute also 
defines misbranding based on what is missing from the label.  In addition to being misbranded 
due to a false or misleading representation, a food can be misbranded if “the labeling…fails to 
reveal facts material in light of such representations or material with respect to consequences 
which may result from the use of the article to which the labeling…relates under the conditions 
of use prescribed in the labeling…thereof or under such conditions of use as are customary or 
usual.”
39  Evaluating whether a label is misleading based solely on representations made enables 
FDA to judge labels based only on what food producers voluntarily include on labels.  This 
                                                             
39 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §201(n), 21 U.S.C. §343. 16 
 
provision, however, also enables FDA to determine that a product is misbranded even if the food 
producer makes no affirmative claims on the label. 
  The authority to deem a product misbranded based on failure to reveal material facts 
potentially expands FDA’s authority over labeling in a significant way.  Not only can the agency 
judge labeling representations and claims; it can also determine that failing to include important 
information on a label violates the FD&C Act.  Thus, the agency isn’t limited only to evaluating 
what food producers claim through labeling, but can also impose requirements to include certain 
information on labels.  Moreover, this provision enables FDA to establish labeling requirements 
through rulemaking, rather than judging labels on a case by case basis through adjudication.
40  
Despite these advantages, FDA has interpreted this provision such that its application to 
production method claims is uncertain. 
“Failure to reveal facts material in light of such representations” 
  One way that FDA is authorized under §201(n) to determine that a label is misleading is 
by evaluating the extent to which the label “fails to reveal facts material in light of such 
representations.”  Thus, if the food producer fails to disclose a fact that is material based on what 
it does disclose on the label, it violates the misbranding provision of the FD&C Act.  Clearly, 
FDA’s authority under this provision to determine a label is misleading depends upon the 
interpretation of the meaning of “material.”  Because Congress did not define materiality in the 
FD&C Act, the agency has broad discretion to determine what constitutes a material fact.
41 
                                                             
40 See American Frozen Food Institute v. Mathews, 413 F.Supp. 548, 552 (D.C.1976), noting that “[t]he cases are 
legion in which Courts have recognized the preference of substantive rulemaking by an agency over the time 
consuming and often unfair process of case by case adjudication.”   
41 See Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d 166, 178 (D.C.2000). 
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  In an early case discussing materiality, a district court upheld FDA regulations that 
required producers of seafood cocktails to include percentage of ingredient-labeling on the 
product packaging.
42  FDA determined that, under §201(n), the percentage of the seafood 
cocktail that was actually seafood was a material fact, the failure of which to disclose resulted in 
misleading labeling.  The regulations required that the amount of the “characterizing ingredient” 
(in this case, seafood) be disclosed when “the proportion of [the] ingredient…has a material 
bearing on price or consumer acceptance.”
43  The court found the substantial consumer interest 
in knowing the percentage of seafood ingredient to be indicative of the materiality of this 
information.
44  Thus, both the price and the consumer acceptance of a product were treated as 
material facts with regard to whether information absent from a label was required to be 
disclosed. 
  American Frozen Food Institute also noted the importance of providing consumers with 
“sufficient information on the labels of food products so that reasoned and informed shopping 
decisions could be made.”
45  Indeed, this is the purpose of food labeling requirements generally.  
Moreover, the court regarded the ability of consumers to make choices between food products to 
be relevant in determining materiality, citing that “several consumers [found disclosure to be] a 
                                                             
42 American Frozen Food Institute v. Mathews, 413 F.Supp. 548 (D.C.1976). 
43 Id. at 554. 
44 Id., noting that “[v]irtually all of the consumer response heartily supported the general principle proposed, and 
several consumers indicated express approval of disclosure of percentage of ingredients for seafood cocktails as a 
necessary device for comparative food shopping.” 
45 Id. at 551. 18 
 
necessary device for comparative food shopping.”
46  The importance of consumer knowledge, 
therefore, is that it enables us to make informed purchasing decisions and compare products 
when making such decisions. 
  If §201(n) gives FDA the authority to promulgate regulations requiring percentage of 
ingredient-labeling requirements, it might also give FDA the authority to require production 
method labeling in certain circumstances.  In both cases, there is no risk to consumer health or 
safety; rather, the concern is consumer interest in having the information and, thus, ability to 
make informed purchasing decisions.  Just as the consumer desire to know the percentage of 
seafood content in American Frozen Food Institute was the foundation for materiality,
47 the 
consumer desire to know the animal welfare or environmental consequences of food choices 
could be a “material fact” that must be disclosed.  Certainly, the proliferation of voluntarily-
made production method claims—such as “cage free,” “humanely raised” and “free range”—
suggests that food producers are aware of a strong consumer desire to have such information.  
Further, American Frozen Food Institute noted the importance of giving consumers the 
information they need to compare food products
48—and the whole purpose of production method 
claims is to enable consumers to choose products that reflect their ethical sensibilities.  Thus, 
FDA could use this prong of §201(n) to mandate production method disclosure, rather than 
simply to regulate voluntarily-made production method claims.     
                                                             
46 Id. at 554. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 19 
 
Under this prong of §201(n), however, the FD&C Act is violated only if the label “fails to 
reveal facts material in light of such representations” (emphasis added).
49  In other words, the 
seafood cocktail producers had to include the percentage of ingredient-labeling because the label 
already claimed the product was seafood—in other words, the percentage of seafood was 
required to be disclosed because it was material “in light of” the representation that the product 
was indeed “seafood.”  Thus, to mandate production method labeling under this prong, the label 
must fail to disclose the production method “in light of” some other representation made on the 
label.   
It may seem unlikely that labels without production method claims would make 
representations that would establish materiality of the facts not disclosed.  However, given the 
extent to which representations about production method claims are made today, such 
representations may be quite common.  For example, some egg labels claim that the hens that 
produced the eggs were “humanely treated.”  Such a representation could be grounds for 
mandating more complete disclosure regarding the actual production method—for example, 
whether the hens were confined in open pastures or windowless sheds.  Furthermore, the 
representations made need not be statements, but could also be “suggested by…word, design, 
device, or any combination thereof.”
50  If the design of the labeling, for example, includes 
pictures of hens roaming through green pastures, such a representation could be the basis for 
required disclosure of production method.  FDA could argue that such labeling is misleading 
because it fails to reveal a fact—the production method—that is material based on the label’s 
representations—pictures of hens roaming through green pastures. 
                                                             
49 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §201(n), 21 U.S.C. §343. 
50 Id. 20 
 
Again, it would still be necessary to ensure that the food producers defined these 
production method claims in way that is not “false or misleading.”  As discussed above, 
consumers who purchase “cage free” eggs believe that the hens that produced the eggs were 
treated humanely.  Currently, that is not the case, making that production method claim 
misleading (as it is used today).  Even if FDA mandated production method claims for certain 
foods under §201(n), for example, the agency must also ensure that the claims are not themselves 
misleading.  Mandating production method claims for certain foods is preferable, therefore, both 
because it requires giving consumers this information and because it would enable FDA to make 
regulations defining the production method claims to ensure that they are not misleading. 
Failure to reveal facts material with respect to consequences of the use of the product 
  Labeling can also be deemed misleading if it “fails to reveal facts…material with respect 
to consequences which may result from the use” of the food “under the conditions of use 
prescribed in the labeling…or under such conditions of use as are customary or usual.”
51  Two 
more recent cases discuss this prong of §201(n) in the context of labeling of products derived 
from cows treated with growth hormones
52 and labeling of genetically engineered foods,
53 both 
of which represent production methods.  Unlike American Frozen Food Institute, in these cases 
the courts upheld FDA’s decision to not require labeling of products that rely on these 
production methods.  In another departure from the principles of American Frozen Food 
                                                             
51 Id. 
52 Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F.Supp. 1178 (W.D.Wis.1995), holding that FDA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously on 
not requiring labeling of products derived from drug-treated cows. 
53 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d 166 (D.C.2000), holding that the failure of FDA to require 
labeling for genetically engineered foods was not arbitrary or capricious, despite widespread consumer interest. 21 
 
Institute, both Stauber and Alliance for Bio-Integrity reject that labeling can be mandated based 
solely on consumer interest.  Despite that these cases preclude mandated production method 
claims based on consumer interest, a different interpretation of this prong of §201(n) might 
enable FDA to require production method claims based on other concerns. 
  In Stauber v. Shalala, consumers argued that there were organoleptic differences (i.e., 
differences “capable of being detected by a human sense organ”) between products derived from 
cows treated with synthetic bovine growth hormone and untreated cows—and that this fact was 
material, thus requiring labeling on products from treated cows.  The court agreed that labels 
must disclose differences in “performance characteristics”—such as organoleptic differences—
because, under §201(n), it “bears on the consequence of the use of the article” and is, therefore, 
“material.”
54  Despite this, the court found that FDA had not acted outside its discretion in 
refusing to require labeling for products derived from treated cows because there was inadequate 
evidence of such differences in “performance characteristics.”
55 
  The consumers urged that widespread consumer demand for labeling products derived 
from treated cows is also a “material fact” that should compel FDA to require such labeling.  
Both FDA and the court rejected this argument.  The court held that consumer opinion was 
insufficient to compel labeling; “a factual predicate to the requirement of labeling,” the court 
explained, “is a determination that a product differs materially from the type of product it 
purports to be.”
56  Thus, FDA must first find that the product itself differs materially—only then 
can it take into account consumer desire for the labeling.  Moreover, if there is no material 
                                                             
54 See Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F.Supp. 1178, 1192-1193 (W.D.Wis.1995). 
55 Id. at 1193. 
56 Id. 22 
 
difference between products derived from treated and untreated cows, then labeling them as 
different would itself violate the misbranding provision.  Thus, absent a material difference, 
using consumer demand to compel labeling would violate the FD&C Act.
57 
  The position of both FDA and the court in Stauber differs markedly from that in 
American Frozen Food Institute.  Stauber limits FDA authority to mandate labeling by 
diminishing the importance of consumer interest and circumscribing the meaning of 
“materiality.”  While American Frozen Food Institute relied upon the importance of consumer 
desire for labeling and the ability of consumers to make informed comparative purchasing 
decisions,
58 Stauber rejects relying on consumer opinion absent a difference in the product.
59  Of 
course, consumers are interested in percentage of ingredient-labeling for seafood cocktails 
because some brands might have a higher percentage than others—and this is a difference in the 
food product itself, just as Stauber focused on differences in milk products.  Despite this, it 
seems that FDA has significantly changed its position as to the importance of consumer demand 
for labeling in Stauber.  Furthermore, in American Frozen Food Institute, the consumer desire 
seemed to create the materiality on which the labeling requirement depended.  In contrast, 
Stauber limits the notion of materiality only to actual differences in the product itself, regardless 
of how consumers might perceive the product.  
  Alliance for Bio-Integrity relied on Stauber’s trivialization of consumer opinion in 
holding that FDA did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in failing to require labeling of 
                                                             
57 Id. (“In the absence of evidence of a material difference between rbST-derived milk and ordinary milk, the use of 
consumer demand as the rationale for labeling would violate the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.”) 
58 American Frozen Food Institute v. Mathews, 413 F.Supp. 548, 554 (D.C.1976). 
59 Stauber v. Shalala, 895 F.Supp. 1178, 1193 (W.D.Wis.1995). 23 
 
genetically-engineered foods.
60  The court held that FDA’s reading of the FD&C Act as not 
authorizing labeling requirements based solely on consumer demand constitutes a reasonable 
interpretation of the statute.
61  This holding suggests, however, that FDA could also reasonably 
interpret §201(n) differently, perhaps including consumer demand as a more important element 
in determining materiality (as the agency seemed to do with regard to percentage of ingredient-
labeling in American Frozen Food Institute).  Indeed, the court noted that—because Congress 
did not address whether materiality applies only to safety concerns or whether it also includes 
consumer interest—FDA has discretion to determine the meaning of materiality.
62  It is 
conceivable that FDA could interpret this provision to take into account not only consumer 
opinion, but also considerations about the ethical implications of food production methods (such 
as impacts on animal welfare or the environment).  Indeed, in the context of production method 
claims, material differences in the food itself seem not to apply at all—the concern is not that the 
eggs themselves are different, but that the way the hens were confined is important as well. 
  The plaintiffs in Alliance for Bio-Integrity also argued that the process of genetic 
modification was itself a “material fact” that required labeling disclosure.
63  Because FDA had 
determined there were no safety concerns related to genetic medication, however, the court 
believed it had little basis on which to determine that the agency’s interpretation of its statute 
                                                             
60 Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F.Supp.2d 166, 178-179 (D.C.2000) 
61 Id. at 179.  The court noted that no “material change” had occurred in the foods at issue, and that FDA had not 
interpreted §201(n) to authorize mandatory food labeling “[a]bsent unique risks to consumer health or uniform 
changes to food derived through rDNA technology.” 
62 Id. at 178. 
63 Id. at 179. 24 
 
was arbitrary and capricious.  The court also referred to a 1924 case that denies the materiality of 
methods of production “[w]hen considered independently of the product.”
64  While this seems to 
preclude any mandatory production method labeling, the court relied on FDA’s broad discretion 
in determining that it had not overstepped its authority.  Thus, FDA could conceivably re-
interpret §201(n) to take into account more factors when determining materiality.  Further, the 
case the court mentioned was decided before the current FD&C Act was even passed, thus 
calling into question its applicability—particularly if it contradicts an FDA interpretation of its 
own statute. 
  While Stauber and Alliance for Bio-Integrity suggest that mandatory labeling of 
production methods may be difficult to impose under the FD&C Act’s misbranding provision, 
the courts in those cases relied heavily on FDA discretion to interpret the provision.  This implies 
that courts would also defer to FDA discretion if the agency broadened its interpretation of 
materiality, thereby allowing considerations such as consumer opinion, animal welfare, and 
environmental consequences to be taken into account.  The FDA itself has noted that it has 
required labeling under §201(n)—on the basis of that information being “material”—when the 
absence of the information might “pose special health or environmental risks” (emphasis 
added).
65  Thus, FDA could determine that a product is misbranded under §201(n)—due to its 
“fail[ure] to reveal facts…material with respect to consequences which may result from the use” 
of the product
66—not only if there are consequences to human health and safety, but also if there 
                                                             
64 Id., quoting U.S. v. Ninety-Five Barrels (More or Less) Alleged Apple Cider Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438, 445 (1924).   
65 Food and Drug Administration, “Guidance for Industry: Voluntary Labeling Indicating Whether Foods Have or 
Have Not Been Developed Using Bioengineering; Draft Guidance.” January 2001. 
66 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, §201(n), 21 U.S.C. §343. 25 
 
are consequences to the environment or animal welfare.  “Consequences” certainly need not refer 
only to health and safety, and the ethical implications of our food choices could be said to result 
from “the use” of the food products we consume. 
Conclusion 
  Food labels on products from eggs to ice cream make clear that today’s consumers are 
concerned with the ethical implications of what we eat.  We care not just about the health and 
safety of our foods, but also whether the animals used in their production were treated humanely 
and what environmental consequences result.  Food producers capitalize on these concerns with 
labels such as “cage free” and “free range.”  And because consumers are willing to pay more for 
products that are consistent with their ethical sensibilities, food producers can charge more by 
adding production method claims to their labels.  Despite this, there is little to no regulation of 
production method claims by either FDA or USDA. 
  Congress could pass legislation authorizing FDA or USDA to regulate production 
method claims, just as it expanded FDA’s jurisdiction over disease prevention and nutrient 
content claims through the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990.  However, even 
without new legislation, the agencies could regulate production method claims under the 
misbranding provisions of the FD&C Act and FMIA.  Under these provisions, they could 
regulate voluntarily-made production method claims that are deemed “false or misleading.”  
Furthermore, FDA may be able to mandate production method labeling in circumstances in 
which the production method is determined to be “material,” thus making labels that fail to 
disclose this information misleading.  Although there are many challenges to using the 
misbranding provision to regulate production method claims, the consequences of our food 
choices are too important to ignore. 